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ABSTRACT
Huge increase in the demand by the wireless sector to use the
airwaves has trained focus on the classic policy problem of
resource scarcity in the ﬁeld. This article illuminates a part of
wireless communication – unlicensed spectrum – where a
particularly fractious debate over the future usage of such space
has developed between incumbent Wi-Fi interests and new
entrants from the ﬁeld of licensed mobile communication. The
case is novel in that private technical standards making has
become a site aimed at resolving what is a contest for co-
existence in unlicensed spectrum. In its conceptualisation of
private technical standards making processes as communication
policy activity, the article illuminates both their aﬀordances and
limitations. It also shows the enduring utility of public regulatory
steer in what are, in eﬀect, private self-regulatory processes aimed
at creating solutions to problems with a complex socio-technical
character.
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Rapid growth inwireless communicationhas been one of themost outstanding features of the
development of the communications sector in recent decades.Mobile communication, which
this facilitates, for example, now comprises both standard voice telephonic and, for many
users, Internet-based communication in all its forms. Added to this, customer access to the
Internet in the home, organisations and outdoor public spaces often takes place through
local area network (LAN) wireless communication (Wi-Fi), in the ﬁrst instance. Such a
huge increase in the demand by the wireless sector to use the airwaves has placed renewed
focus on a classic communication policy problem: spectrum scarcity. Spectrum historically
has been viewed as a highly limited resource whose allocation and use required careful man-
agement in the public interest through direct regulation. Yet one particularly interesting –
though under-explored in public policy analysis – aspect of the burgeoning demand for wire-
less communication relates to a part of the spectrum reserved for use without a regulatory
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body-issued licence. Here, strong diﬀerences betweenWi-Fi and mobile cellular telecommu-
nications players over the future of this space have developed. The ensuing contestation and
the nature of eﬀorts to resolve it constitute the focus of this article.
Wi-Fi interests are historic incumbents of the part of the unlicensed spectrum environ-
ment under consideration here (namely 2.4 and 5 GHz), taking advantage of the open entry
operational approach to the use of available capacity. Mobile cellular players, by contrast,
hail from a comparatively closed, proprietorial, control-centric licensed operational environ-
ment, whose cultural characteristics they have wished to introduce into unlicensed spaces as
their interest in exploiting them (because they are free to enter), alongside their licensed allo-
cation, has intensiﬁed. In such contentious circumstances, direct public regulatory policy
interventions might be expected to occur to resolve the future of the unlicensed spectrum
space. Yet the article shows how this has not been the case. Instead, ongoing, competing
technical work undertaken in several private standards development organisational contexts
has dominated eﬀorts to determine the future of the currently uneasy relationship between
Wi-Fi and mobile broadband players. The article thus contends that private technical stan-
dards development has assumed a public policy making role. Activity of this kind, though
poorly understood, is important in policy terms since technical standards establish the con-
text for the development and use of new products and services. The article shows evidence of
competing technical (which we conceive as policy) solutions to the co-existence problem,
which have aimed to shape the co-existence agenda, in an incompletely resolved policy pro-
cess, in our terms. It illustrates, ultimately, how private technical standards making alone is
unable to address complex socio-technical problems like co-existence.
We illustrate and explain how organisational venues dominated by interests from the
mobile broadband business have led work to develop technical speciﬁcationswhich articulate
and present particular versions of co-existence. Historically, the Institute for Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) played the lead role in standards-making in the 2.4 and 5
GHz unlicensed bands. However, in the co-existence debate, it has merely been able to add
its own updated technical standard – and thus techno-cultural version of co-existence – to
a group of competing techno-policy co-existence solutions. The article shows how standards
development processes failed to resolve the key technical issue of energy detection levels
(EDL) andmechanisms for accessing transmission channels in unlicensed spectrum to ensure
the avoidance of collisions between transmitted packets in the jointly used space. Whilst an
arcane technical issue in one sense, in another, it demarcates essential diﬀerences in oper-
ational and cultural approaches of licensed mobile communications and Wi-Fi players.
The article thence provides evidence of the importance of public legislative steer in the
privately driven journey towards addressing co-existence. Here, the EU, through its man-
dating of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), has provided an
organisational venue for Wi-Fi actors to exert pressure on licensed broadband interests to
reach agreement on energy detection levels that would provide fairer access to unlicensed
spectrum for Wi-Fi services. In Europe, Wi-Fi functioning is based on the EN 301 893
ETSI standard, authorised politically by the EU. ETSI’s current standards making activity
is likely to ensure that technical parameters suﬃcient to deliver – albeit uneasy – co-exist-
ence between licensed mobile and Wi-Fi interests will be written into its amended EN 301
893 wireless standard to ensure that devices using this standard will be operable across the
EU in the future. This contains added resonance because of the inﬂuence of ETSI stan-
dards making for communications in unlicensed environments globally.
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To illustrate and explain its case, the article adapts and applies features of work onMul-
tiple Streams (Kingdon, 1984) to the ﬁeld of private technical standards making to illumi-
nate why and how the co-existence problem has materialised and developed into a shared
agenda for policy action through technical standards making. The framework explains the
existing controversies in the wireless local area network co-existence debate (deﬁned as the
problem stream); examines potential solutions to the problem which have emerged
(deﬁned as the policy stream); and analyses pressures encountered and responded to by
the involved actors in the chosen standards development processes (deﬁned as the political
stream).
The article is structured as follows. The next section sets out the main features of Mul-
tiple Streams analysis. This is followed by an exploration of the main organisational con-
texts for unlicensed spectrum standards making. Drawing on and applying the core
elements of the previous two sections, the remainder of the article proceeds to illustrate
the case of technical standards for co-existence in unlicensed spectrum through the pro-
blem, policy and political streams of the Multiple Streams approach.
Analysing standards development as a policy process in communications
The arcane process of writing and securing agreement on technically robust, eﬃcacious
standards underpins future development of a plethora of new information and communi-
cation products and services with economic and societal ramiﬁcations. Such processes are
multi-faceted in character and often subject to time constraints. They can be highly con-
tested by a range of diﬀerent actors and may evolve across a variety of national and inter-
national fora.
In political science, the Multiple Streams approach has been developed to understand
policy in similarly complex environments, though it has not been deployed to date in the
ﬁeld of international speciﬁcation and standards making in communications. Multiple
Streams was, rather, in its ﬁrst iteration, devised by Kingdon (1984) to assist the under-
standing of agenda setting in government policy-making. This work focused mostly on
national level contexts and provided a detailed understanding of policy environments in
which the state was a prominent actor. We propose in this article that its features can
be extended to understand international organisational environments in which various
forms of private self-regulatory governance processes operate, in this case technical stan-
dards development for spectrum co-existence. We argue that is the case since Multiple
Streams is driven by three central concerns: ﬁrst, the emergence and nature of key policy
problems; second, the contexts within which key policy protagonists present potential
competing policy solutions to the existing policy problems; and, third, key political factors
that are at work in inﬂuencing the circumstances which lead to the linking of policy pro-
blems to potential policy solutions, thus setting a course of future policy action. With ori-
gins in the ‘garbage can’ model of Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972), Multiple Streams
oﬀers a lens to explain how the policy processes evolve (Ackrill & Kay, 2011) ‘under con-
ditions of ambiguity’ (Ackrill, Kay, & Zahariadis, 2013, p. 871). Mintrom and Norman
(2009) emphasise the incremental nature of most changes (after Lindblom, 1968) which
they attribute to the need to deal with inherent issue complexity. This includes unclearly
deﬁned actor (in our case technical) preferences, ﬂuid and thus unstable participation in
policy processes (in our case taking place across standards development organisational
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contexts), and ideologically motivated institutional settings (displaying techno-cultural
diﬀerences between Wi-Fi and licensed operators, in our case). In respect of the latter,
there are times when policy problems are not solvable in designated policy settings leading
to the search for alternatives. This can intensify as the time-based need for a solution to be
achieved becomes more apparent. Zahariadis (2016, pp. 6–7) notes that institutions, which
we view broadly to incorporate organisational contexts for policy development constitute ‘an
imperfect guide for action’ thus providing opportunity for ﬂexibility and experimentation. In
our case, the Broadband Random-Access Networks (BRAN) committee of ETSI emerged as
a key venue to consider the co-existence problem and displayed enough organisational ﬂexi-
bility to allow development of the co-existence agenda in the direction of a solution.
The Streams approach is particularly apposite for illuminating the co-existence case in
that it envisions policy activity as developing in three initially independent streams. The
problem stream focuses on the key issues of concern – and often dispute – in policy pro-
cesses. Here, focus is trained on the origins of policy problems, as well as their core fea-
tures. Here policy problems become apparent as a consequence of evidence that a
problem exists. This can also occur through so-called focusing events, landmark occur-
rences which highlight the problem at hand. In our case, evidence of the intensifying
deployment of licensed mobile broadband traﬃc in the unlicensed space, thus increasing
the likelihood of conﬂict with Wi-Fi operators, as well as technical work of standards set-
ting bodies with implications for co-existence, were central to awareness of the co-exist-
ence problematic in the 2.4 and 5Ghz bands.
Separate – though ultimately closely related – to the problem stream, the policy stream
explores the range of proposed solutions – or alternatives in Kingdon’s terms – that may
exist to address policy problems. An important feature of the policy stream is that these
solutions are not necessarily generated in a directly responsive mode to the problem at
hand. This points to a history of often detailed work leading to products or outcomes
whose value, in respect of a problem at hand, only becomes realised at an opposite
moment in time. This implies that the alternatives presented in the policy stream may
have been developed with a diﬀerent initial purpose than to address directly the evident
problem. They may, in fact, assume that the latter does not exist. This feature of Multiple
Streams makes it a particularly insightful tool to understand the case of co-existence.
Technical standards to exploit unlicensed Wi-Fi and licensed mobile broadband spectrum
environments, respectively, were developed in separate – though also overlapping – tech-
nical (or policy, in Streams terminology) communities across an incremental historical
trajectory. The primary aim was to exploit the available resource for communication pur-
poses. It was implicitly assumed that the technical standards in question could ensure co-
existence with other users.
Yet, the problem stream, in our case, indicated that this was not so. As the article shows,
further action was needed to ensure the linking of the co-existence problem stream with a
potential policy solution. Understanding this linkage mechanism, termed coupling, is a
key focus of Multiple Streams analysis, which aims to illuminate the circumstances
when the problem and policy streams are ready to connect with each other. This could
occur when both a problem is widely recognised as being signiﬁcant enough to search
for a solution and that it is understood that a range of potential policy solutions may
be in existence. However, for coupling to occur eﬀectively, the Streams approach argues
that the intervention of a policy entrepreneur is necessary.
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Policy entrepreneurs, which for us can be individual or organisational expend sig-
niﬁcant resources to advocate for policy development in a direction they favour (King-
don, 2011). In complex and ambiguous situations, they can ‘craft contestable meaning’,
which for us can include technological meaning. They also ‘pursue strategies to join
together problems and policies into attractive packages’ (Ackrill et al., 2013, p. 873),
through the coupling process. We extend the idea of ‘attractive packages’ to mean
acceptable technical standards. The policy entrepreneur plays a key active role in coup-
ling problems to potential solutions when the time for doing so is appropriate or, in
Multiple Streams terms, when a policy window exists. Policy windows are moments or
contexts when change is ripe to take place and can form in the problem stream. These
‘constitute triggers that delimit and/or help frame the way issues are debated’ (Ackrill
et al., 2013, p. 873; Kingdon, 1995). Here problems and policies become clear and their
potential linkage to create a change in future policy action becomes an issue con-
sidered vital to resolve. Policy windows serving the same purpose also form in what
the Multiple Streams literature refers to as the political stream.
In Kingdon’s (1984) original work, two core elements of the political stream are the
actions of national governments or parliaments and what was termed as the national
mood. We argue that these features are particularly useful in understanding the evol-
ution of the case of co-existence. First, it is important to acknowledge that the world of
international standards making is diﬀerent from the issues of national policy making
envisioned in the political stream originally. However, in the case of co-existence in
unlicensed spectrum, we show that political-legislative change in wireless communi-
cations at the European Union level in the shape of the 2014 Radio Equipment Direc-
tive (European Parliament and Council, 2014) was a key political condition leading to
the development of the work on co-existence analysed in this article, since it necessi-
tated technical standards making activity to ensure compliance with it.
Second, the idea of the ‘national mood’, or perspectives and preferences of citizenry,
as a key political factor in policy change is also important in understanding co-existence.
Applied to the context of technical standards making in this article, we extend its
deﬁnition into the speciﬁc context of common consumer and user behaviours and pre-
ferences in wireless communication. Technical standards development, conducted in
specialist organisational contexts, takes place away from the day-to-day experience of
consumers. Yet, those leading it are highly cognisant of – and sensitive to – current
and likely future consumer preferences and usage patterns. Here, as more people use
their mobile phones to access the Internet, the practice of ‘oﬄoading’ has become pop-
ular, where users switch between licensed mobile and Wi-Fi services, when the latter are
available. It has been predicted that oﬄoading will have risen from 54% to 59% of all
total mobile data traﬃc from all mobile connected devices between 2017 and 2022
(Cisco, 2019). Coupled with the established feature of regular mobile handset upgrading,
the need for new handsets to incorporate the latest licensed and Wi-Fi based function-
ality is an important feature of the political stream of the co-existence debate. The article
shows how political-legislative and consumer public factors provided a window of
opportunity in the political stream to allow it to be coupled with the problem and policy
streams in the consideration of co-existence. We develop this analysis in detail in the
remainder of the article.
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Standards development for co-existence: organisational contexts and
salience
Spectrum capacity in the so-called ISM (industrial, scientiﬁc and medical) bands (e.g.,
902–928 MHz, 2.4 GHz, 5.7–5.8 GHz frequency bands) was highly exclusive initially in
its uses (e.g., cordless phones, microwave ovens, military radars) (Guvenc, Gezici, Sahino-
glu, & Kozat, 2011, pp. 6–7). In 1985, however, the US Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) undertook the key regulatory measure to open the ISM bands for wireless
communications on a licence-exempt basis, provided that they did not create interference
with primary and secondary occupancy rights holding users of spectrum, such as the mili-
tary and, by contrast, terrestrial broadcasters. In 1997, the FCC made a second important
intervention through releasing an additional 300 MHz of frequencies for unlicensed use by
short range, high-speed wireless communication devices in the 5GHz band (Cooklev,
2004, p. 10).1 Whilst monitoring the development of unlicensed communication, it there-
after adopted a hands-oﬀ role in the sector’s evolution which has persisted to the time of
writing (conﬁrmed by authors’ interviews, July 2017 and July 2018). Instead, the IEEE’s
Committee 802, Subcommittee 11 (hereafter IEEE 802.11) developed as a key private
venue for standards development work that would shape wireless short-range communi-
cations. Created in 1990, IEEE 802.11 introduced its ﬁrst standard in 1997 and, by 2000,
the organisation had two standards for the use of unlicensed spectrum – IEEE 802.11a and
IEEE 802.11b (Greenstein, 2007, pp. 13–14). These and the subsequently developed ver-
sions of the 802.11 standard (most importantly for the ongoing co-existence contestation,
the 802.11ax standard) became commonly known as Wi-Fi. From this account, it is clear
that standards have a tendency to evolve in an incremental fashion, developing strong path
developmental characteristics.
In Europe, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), created in
1988 by the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations
(CEPT), developed a key role in the introduction of Wi-Fi. ETSI includes state adminis-
trations as well as major telecoms companies, manufacturers, network operators, service
and content providers, universities and research bodies, user organisations, and consultan-
cies (ETSI, 2016a). It is a ‘pay to play’ organisation with a stratiﬁed membership where
members buy voting rights and weight through subscription (authors’ interview, 2017;
ETSI, 2018). ETSI is one of the organisations oﬃcially recognised by the EU as a provider
of European Standards (ENs). Within ETSI, the Broadband Radio Access Networks
(BRAN) committee has played a role in the promotion of the 802.11 standard family his-
torically (ETSI, 2016b). In fact, the EN 301 893 standard was written in part with the IEEE
802.11 standard in mind (authors’ interview, 12 October 2016). The ETSI EN 301 893
standard ‘instructs’ devices operating in unlicensed bands how precisely to access a chan-
nel. Thus, in contrast to the US, the EU, through legislation and standards development
activity, has played a signiﬁcantly more hands-on role in the development of Wi-Fi. It
also is important to note that ETSI’s resonance for co-existence goes beyond the EU
since it comprises as many as 865 members from 66 countries across ﬁve continents
(ETSI, 2018) and its technical speciﬁcations are thus copied by states beyond Europe.
Wi-Fi aside, the growth of licensed mobile communications and attendant capacity
pressures led players in the sector to move towards developing technical speciﬁcations
and standards to allow use of unlicensed spectrum space, through a process known as
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oﬄoading, based on the Long Term Evolution (LTE) technical standard which under-
pinned licensed operators’ services historically. This involved technical work aimed at
creating new LTE-based speciﬁcations to secure a more controlled use of the unlicensed
space in the less crowded 5 GHz bands. To utilise the available capacity in these bands,
key initiatives have occurred in the LTE-U (Long Term Evolution – Unlicensed) Forum
and a formal institutional standard setting process undertaken within the much larger
3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) (see below). Established in 1998, 3GPP has
deﬁned technical speciﬁcations for advanced cellular communications, originating from
‘a 3rd generation mobile system based on evolved Global System for Mobile Communi-
cations (GSMTM)’ (ETSI, 2016c). 3GPP work, building on LTE, focused on Internet Pro-
tocol (IP) based technical solutions to transport voice, messaging and data services over
cellular networks (3GPP, 2016a). 3GPP unites under its structure seven telecommunica-
tions standardisation bodies from across the world that serve as its Organisational Part-
ners and ‘determine [its] general policy and strategy’ (3GPP, 2016b). Very importantly
for the current co-existence debate, one of these partners is ETSI (see Table 1).
Thus, the standards development organisation (SDO) world overall is organisationally
nexus-like and overlapping. The membership of 3GPP is diverse and includes almost all
major cellular, but also many Wi-Fi, related companies and alliances (see 3GPP, 2016c).
The members of the LTE-U Forum are part of 3GPP. The Wi-Fi Alliance2 industry group
is also an individual member of 3GPP, while the diverse Wireless Broadband Alliance
(WBA)3 is one of 3GPP’s partners. The landscape, in policy terms, is thus interconnected
and multi-forum (see Table 1). This interconnectedness, in theory at least, provides the
opportunity for the resolution of conﬂict that might arise from diﬀerent technical stan-
dards development processes.
There is a notable diﬀerence in the participation cultures of these organisations, most
particularly between 3GPP and IEEE 802 (authors’ interviews, 12 October 2016 and 12–13
July 2017). While participation in both organisations is undoubtedly motivated by corpor-
ate business goals, in IEEE 802 attendees at standards development meetings hailing from
a range of high tech corporate telecommunications players, when voting in any standards
development process, are required to act in a personal capacity using their expertise to
make decisions in the general or common interest of technological progress (see IETF
RFC, 7241, 2014; authors’ interviews 12–13 July 2017). Attempted expansion of this
Table 1. Wi-Fi/LTE (unlicensed) SDOs.
Source: Authors.
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cultural norm beyond IEEE – in the form of individual policy entrepreneurship – would
create a crucial window of opportunity to resolve the co-existence problem (see p. 25).
The problem stream: deﬁning the terms of co-existence between LTE and
Wi-Fi in unlicensed spectrum space
Spectrum usage undertaken on the basis of cellular and Wi-Fi standards (LTE and IEEE
802.11 respectively) diﬀers markedly. These technical diﬀerences have created diﬀerent
operational cultures and distinct tension in terms of co-existence. This can be understood
in respect of the idea of fairness, in particular in relation to access to network capacity.
Some brief technical explanation is needed to illustrate this.
Wi-Fi devices gain access to spectral channels in a so-called ‘contention-based’ process,
using the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) technical pro-
tocol (Jeon et al., 2015, p. 2321). Here, an automatic ‘clear channel assessment’ process is
performed before signal transmission occurs (Kwon et al., 2016, p. 4). The contention
mechanism operates by a process of trying to avoid collision using the so-called listen
before talk (LBT) algorithm, whereby a station attempting to transmit selects a random
listening time duration. After it has detected no user transmitting during this random dur-
ation, it proceeds to transmit (authors’ interview, 12 October 2016). This is known as Wi-
Fi’s ‘random back oﬀ’ mechanism (Google, 2015). The Wi-Fi 802.11 standard family
includes an additional back oﬀ mechanism, called ‘exponential back oﬀ’. Here, if a signal
collision occurs, the length of the random back oﬀ interval referred to above is automati-
cally increased before transmission recommences, thus minimising (though not removing
entirely) the risk of further signal interference in densely populated (known as densiﬁed)
network environments in Google (2015); see also DSA, (2015a, p. 3); Public Interest
Organizations (2015, p. 14).
By contrast, cellular communication through LTE operates on a so-called ‘contention-
free’ or schedule-based system, ‘designed to transmit persistently as long as there are [data]
packets awaiting to be served’ (Jeon et al., 2015, p. 2321). This provides better throughput
for LTE based signals (Public Interest Organizations, 2015, p. 14) and thus better quality of
service to the user but is problematic for co-existence since the reserved space it monop-
olises can leaveWi-Fi devices operating in the unlicensed environment starved of access to
transmission channels, because LTE does not allow ﬂexibility for the free or ‘idle’ periods
of opportunity (Cano et al., 2016, p. 2) on which Wi-Fi capitalises for communication.
Therefore, the inherent techno-cultural ‘politeness’ in the design of Wi-Fi devices creates
a distinct disadvantage when operating in proximity to LTE transmitters as is increasingly
the case in the unlicensed space, something exacerbated by the control-centric modus
operandi of LTE. This is important, since historically:
It is the combination of all three of these politeness protocols, (LBT, initial wait, exponential
back oﬀ) and [its] ability to sense extremely weak signals… that make [Wi-Fi] such a good
neighbor to other technologies. (DSA, 2015a, p. 3)
Wi-Fi stakeholders have frequently pointed out that these ‘good neighbour’ characteristics
have also provided opportunities for innovation and deployment of other technologies to
operate eﬃcaciously next to it. Examples include coexistence with Bluetooth, Zigbee, and
cordless phones in the 2.4 GHz band (DSA, 2015a, p. 5; Nwana, 2016, p. 2). The
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perception of ‘fair’ coexistence between Wi-Fi and licensed providers diﬀers markedly.
The results of technical simulation exercises conducted by proponents of LTE are often
disputed by the Wi-Fi community (Alderfer, 2015; Andreoli-Fang, 2015).
A key focusing event in highlighting the co-existence problem occurred in 2014, when a
closed group of mobile carrier, chipset, and equipment manufacturers (led by Verizon and
also comprising Qualcomm, Ericsson, Nokia/Alcatel, and Samsung) formed in the United
States and put forward a technical speciﬁcation (LTE-U) for the deployment of LTE in
unlicensed spectrum bands. LTE-U was intended for use by licenced mobile carriers
only (Feld, 2015a) and excluded other players with major stakes in the Wi-Fi sector,
including Cisco, Broadcom, Microsoft, Cablelabs, and Google, all part of the Wi-Fi Alli-
ance. It operated according to a so-called ‘duty-cycle approach’, which performed a par-
ticularly narrow, self-ﬁrst techno-cultural articulation of sharing, by ‘owning’ spectrum for
a chosen period of time and then allowing other devices (such as Wi-Fi) to use it in the
remaining time (authors’ interview, 12 October 2016; Paolini, 2015, p. 12). This amounted
to the cultural antithesis of Wi-Fi based communication. Whilst LTE-U incorporated the
Wi-Fi originated back oﬀmechanism, it was absent the ‘listen before talk’ (LBT) technique
(WBA, 2015). Its activated duty cycle mechanism would share the selected channel based
on ‘on and oﬀ’ periods, which would be determined, crucially, by the LTE-U operators
themselves on a self-regulatory principle (DSA, 2015a, p. 4).
The Dynamic Spectrum Alliance (DSA), an industry association sympathetic to the
position of Wi-Fi in the co-existence debate, argued that the mechanism would give con-
trol to LTE-U players to determine allocated time to Wi-Fi based counterparts, and
would impact negatively on the real time voice and video communications opportunity
of the latter (DSA, 2015, p. 4). By contrast, Qualcomm refuted accusations of unfair
coexistence (Qualcomm, 2015) by arguing that LTE-U did not impact on the perform-
ance of a Wi-Fi device any more than would another Wi-Fi neighbour (Cablevision et al.,
2015, August 29).
Functionality and fairness aside, the entrance of LTE-based technology into the incum-
bent Wi-Fi space pointed up the thorny issue of international regulatory diﬀerences of
approach to unlicensed spectrum use. In Europe and Japan, licensed cellular transmitters
are required to deploy LBT when using unlicensed bands, something not speciﬁed in
North America, South Korea and China (Giupponi et al., 2016). Since the ETSI EN 301
893 harmonised standard, mandated by the EU’s Radio Equipment Directive, required
the use of LBT, LTE-U could be deployed in the key markets of the US, China, and
India, but not in Europe. Despite creating this fraction, as we show below in the Political
Stream section, the role of European level political preferences expressed through legis-
lation was a key factor in setting the agenda for action to address the co-existence problem.
True to their well-known laissez-faire approach, the FCC (in line with the US Congress)
maintained the position that discussions should be carried out within and between the for-
mal private technical standard-setting bodies (Feld, 2015b) (mostly 3GPP and IEEE 802)
and the relevant industry alliances (LTE-U, the Wi-Fi Alliance, and the Wireless Broad-
band Alliance). It nonetheless decided to withhold the certiﬁcation of the LTE-U devices
for operation in the United States until industry parties resolved contested technical claims
they held. This proved an important focusing event in highlighting the extent of the co-
existence problem. A subsequent joint coexistence test plan exercise developed under
the auspices of the Wi-Fi Alliance. Though initially announced as a compromise solution,
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the test produced proved an unsuccessful policy window since it was not endorsed by key
stakeholders and there was no obligation on service providers and vendors to run it. The
process delayed the emergence of LTE-U based products on the market by a year which
might have been considered as a victory in policy terms for the Wi-Fi community but
merely served to highlight the persistence of the coexistence problem.
In February 2017, the US FCC ﬁnally authorised the operation of LTE-U devices.
Whilst potentially a key focusing event, the core issue of contestation in the Wi-Fi proble-
matic remained: disagreement on the inherent mechanism for spectrum use by LTE-U
technology (LBT) and the energy detection levels necessary to prevent interference and
enable ‘fair’ access to spectrum. Energy detection levels are crucial since they determine
the decision taken on whether or not a channel or medium is busy and thus whether or
not the device concerned is able to transmit a signal. Nevertheless, by this stage co-exist-
ence as a key techno-political problematic had become widely recognised among licensed
and unlicensed spectrum players.
The policy stream: LTE-LAA, 802.11ax and the development of unlicensed
spectrum use
The development of the LTE-U standard served to epitomise the co-existence problem
rather than resolve it. However, a separate LTE-based standard development process –
known as LTE-LAA (Licence Assisted Access) was undertaken in an alternative organis-
ational venue. This standard evolved simultaneously to – and became closely connected
with – work within the Wi-Fi community of the IEEE to create the next generation of
the Wi-Fi standard, known as 802.11ax. Both standards developed into potential policy
options to address co-existence.
The LTE-LAA development process was undertaken in 3GPP (whose membership
included the founders of the LTE-U Forum) with the aim of creating a ‘single global sol-
ution’ that responded to the challenge of overcoming the international regulatory diﬀer-
ences noted above on use of unlicensed spectrum (Flore, 2015; Paolini, 2015, p. 11) as well
as technical diﬀerences over communication protocol and energy detection. Unlike LTE-
U, a formal standard creation process commenced within 3GPP. Yet, the LTE-LAA stan-
dard had a particularly closed techno-cultural underpinning in that it catered only for
licensed providers through aiming to allow aggregation, by a primary licensed carrier,
of one or more supplemental unlicensed channels (WBA, 2015, p. 1). It did crucially, how-
ever, include the LBT mechanism for functioning in the 5 GHz band (Qualcomm, 2015,
p. 2; see IEEE, 2015, also Paolini, 2015, p. 11). In March 2016, 3GPP announced the near
completion of work on LTE-LAA (3GPP, 2016b) and devices using it were approved by
the FCC in September 2016 (Brenner, 2018). Despite the incorporation of LBT, a key
diﬀerence between LTE-LAA and 802.11ax remained in respect of the detailed speciﬁcs
of energy emission.
Throughout 2016 and 2017, a potential policy window opened when 3GPP and IEEE
802.11 took part in a resolution seeking process, by communicating through liaison state-
ments, initiated by the policy entrepreneurship of the IEEE 802.11 committee. The core of
the contestation between the two sides was the seemingly obdurate employment by Wi-Fi
and LTE-LAA of diﬀerent means of detecting energy from transmissions by nearby
devices.
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In essence, the system used in Wi-Fi devices is more noise sensitive than that of LAA.
This increases the risks of ‘unfair’ access and use of spectrum when both operate in the
same bands. Whilst LAA underpinned devices are designed to operate by detecting and
avoiding interference with transmissions using the Energy Detection (ED)-only mechan-
ism with a threshold of −72 dBm (decibel-milliwatts), Wi-Fi incorporates a more sensitive
two stage ED (at a threshold of −62 dBm) and Preamble Detection (PD) (at a threshold of
−82 dBm) process. This PD accounts for Wi-Fi’s exceptional ‘politeness’ characteristics.
The politics of the interaction proved fractious and the policy window proved unsuc-
cessful. IEEE 802 argued that 3GPP should incorporate a lower (more sensitive) ED
threshold or include in LAA’s design a PD system for increasing the detection sensitivity
of devices operating according to it. The 3GPP rejected this argument and returned a
counter proposal to IEEE 802 that the latter should consider the application of a less sen-
sitive ED-only mechanism with a detection threshold chosen as optimal by the 3GPP (i.e.,
−72 dBm) in the IEEE’s ongoing work on the 802.11ax standard. Negotiations ended in
deadlock when IEEE 802 rejected this counter proposal citing the long established and
widely deployed Wi-Fi technological legacy of which dual detection was an integral
part. The new IEEE 802.11ax standard, ﬁrst vaunted in 2013, and commenced formally
in 2014, was scheduled for formal ratiﬁcation by the end of 2019. The standard addresses
the key technological challenge of managing in a more controlled and more eﬀective
fashion signals in the increasingly crowded, ‘densiﬁed’, spaces of unlicensed spectrum.4
In this respect, 802.11ax can be regarded as a direct technical response to the concerns
of licensed communications providers about the variable service quality of user experience
in the unlicensed space, though it diﬀered distinctly from LTE-LAA in respect of energy
detection levels as a policy option to deliver co-existence.
The ETSI policy window, policy entrepreneurship and eﬀorts to couple the
co-existence problem and policy streams
Despite the seemingly implacable impasse in potential coupling of the problem and policy
streams of the co-existence debate, a policy window of opportunity emerged in Europe,
drawing on its more public regulatory interventionist character in technical standards
making (see next section). This led to a process to revise ETSI’s EN 301 893 harmonised
standard, which establishes the essential requirements for radio equipment to use spec-
trum eﬃciently and to avoid harmful interference. In an attempt to seek an alternative
organisational venue to address the ongoing co-existence problematic, Wi-Fi stakeholders
focused on the work undertaken in ETSI’s technical committee on Broadband Radio
Access Networks (BRAN). Importantly – in a situation of policy deadlock where existing
standards making venues yielded merely articulations of diﬀerence – ETSI BRAN created
a policy window by acting as a more ‘neutral’ forum for altering the unlicensed space tech-
nical standards making agenda towards the meaningful pursuit of fair coexistence terms
between LAA and Wi-Fi through the EN 301 893 revision process.
Here, a detailed – and at times fractious – debate began at the beginning of 2016. By
mid-2017, two spectrum access options for radio equipment in unlicensed bands were
developed and presented. Recognisable as an attempt to couple the problem and policy
streams, these counterpart technical solutions were packaged as a co-existence policy com-
promise. This stipulated both a single energy detection threshold and a dual detection
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threshold of ED and PD, and covered versions of the Wi-Fi standard up to – but not
including – the IEEE 802.11ax standard. The coupling process commenced with the initial
acceptance of the package as a pragmatic outcome, as ‘it was not possible to allow a “carve
out” for 802.11ax given it did not exist at the time’ (authors’ interview, July 2017). Given
the importance of 802.11ax, it was, however, agreed that the rules would be revisited. In
the latter process, there was initially no sign of movement to a new technical understand-
ing on energy detection levels, merely a trenchant tactical re-statement of preferred pos-
itions: the licensed cellular industry in 3GPP was still motivated to remove the dual
threshold option used by Wi-Fi, while the Wi-Fi industry hoped that it could convince
ETSI BRAN to remove the single (ED-only) threshold. However, central for the Wi-Fi
industry remained its desire to ensure that the 802.11ax standard was covered by the
revised ETSI standard to allow the use of dual thresholds in its future products and ser-
vices, as had been the case for existing similar Wi-Fi standard variants in ETSI’s Harmo-
nised Standard.
Evidence of collective policy entrepreneurship emerged with eﬀorts to address the log-
gerheads at which the protagonists found themselves, through pressure exerted by Cisco,
Intel, Broadcom, and HPE, from the Wi-Fi stakeholders’ side. These ﬁrms proposed to
keep rules to continue with the status quo (i.e., allow both options) as already deﬁned
in the previous revision of the ETSI standard, but to extend these rules to cover IEEE
802.11ax. Some licensed mobile network operators among 3GPP’s LTE stakeholders
initially opposed the proposed compromise and the discussions at the March 2018
ETSI meeting showed no signs of consensus (authors’ interview, 2018). However, the pos-
ition changed unexpectedly with a key piece of individual policy entrepreneurship from a
participant associated with Ericsson (a company strongly interested in LTE initiatives in
unlicensed spectrum), who suggested, in his personal capacity, a way to exit from the
deadlock. This action was not in line with the established company membership-based
decision taking cultural norm of ETSI BRAN. Instead, it was reminiscent of the cultural
norm and modus operandi of the IEEE 802.11 committee. In essence, the policy entrepre-
neur proposed that all parties take the bold step of accepting the still unﬁnalised 802.11ax
standard as a so-called ‘market reality’ (authors’ interview, 09 May 2018).5 This proposal
was accepted and completed the coupling process between the problem and policy
streams. Furthermore, in a signal of clear agenda shift in the direction of the practical pur-
suit of co-existence, participants in ETSI BRAN reached a common position agreeing on
the need to test real world coexistence performances of 802.11ax and LTE-LAA. Both ETSI
and Wi-Fi Alliance members were requested to make coexistence test reports available,
which, according to multiple participants, would ‘provide the industry the best hints’
on enabling acceptable coexistence (IEEE, 2017).
The political stream in the debate on co-existence: policy windows of
opportunity and coupling with the problem and policy streams
The EU governmental stimulus provided to the standards making process in Europe by
the 2014 Radio Equipment Directive exerted an important pressure in the political stream
on standards developing parties. This directive replaced the 1999 Radio and Telecommu-
nication Terminal Equipment Directive and, as a consequence, required the European
Commission to mandate ETSI to revise the European EN 301 893 Harmonised Standard.
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The directive was scheduled to come into eﬀect in June 2016, with a mandatory compli-
ance among EU Member States of June 2017. The EN 301 893, however, needed to be
revised earlier, in 2016, to allow approval and transition processes to be executed in
time, thus precipitating the activity in ETSI BRAN analysed in the previous section.
Thus, EU level political-legislative change created an important window of opportunity
in the political stream which contributed to its coupling with the co-existence problem
and policy streams.
The second vital aspect of the political stream for standards making parties was aware-
ness of the consumer public’s preferences for mobile communication in licensed and Wi-
Fi spaces. This article has earlier outlined the interconnected nature of the licensed mobile
broadband and Wi-Fi sectors in terms of standards making. As usage of laptops, tablets
and mobile phones has grown, wireless communications users have become a vital inter-
national consumer public. Regularly upgraded wireless devices are now often both Wi-Fi
and LTE enabled. This is particularly important for mobile phones, which are used
increasingly to access the Internet, often through utilising the process of switching or
‘oﬄoading’ between licensed and Wi-Fi services. Design and manufacture of new dual
mode enabled equipment is thus both costly and something subject to signiﬁcant commer-
cial time pressures, yet at the same time potentially highly lucrative. Industry analysts pre-
dicted that whilst latest ﬁfth generation (5G) licensed mobile services will provide
customers with increased data allowances and connection speeds, ‘new application
demands on 5G are also going to move upwards… encouraging similar behaviours of
oﬄoad as 4G’ (Cisco, 2019) in the future. As pointed out at IEEE 802.11, the dual
threshold was included in an earlier version of the EN 301 893 Harmonised Standard
and acknowledgment made that any drastic change of rules would jeopardise existing
economic and social beneﬁts of Wi-Fi to European citizens (IEEE, 2017). EU policy
makers have advocated a technological neutrality approach in regulating electronic com-
munications. The IEEE 802.11 community argued that extension of the dual threshold in
the revision of EN 301 893 would achieve such neutrality without putting at risk the socio-
economic value associated with the additional beneﬁts of IEEE 802.11ax for the European
community (IEEE, 2017).
The previous section has shown how, as the coupling process between the problem and
policy streams unfolded, the crucial latest version of the 802.11 standard, according to
which a raft of new equipment would be built and sold, could not be covered initially
as the standards making process had not yet been completed. The incomplete 802.11ax
standard development process raised the prospect of devices underpinned by it not
being operable in Europe. This, in theory, would have knock on consequences for devices,
such as laptops, incorporating the 802.11ax standard, but also LTE-based use in the case of
dual mode mobile phones. The latter devices might not be ascribed as enabled with the
latest Wi-Fi technology, making them considerably less attractive to customers as a
whole. Awareness among standards making interests of the two crucial public preferences
for regular device upgrades, on the one hand, and smooth transition and interoperability
on mobile devices between licensed and unlicensed Wi-Fi environments (authors’ inter-
view, 2017; Pwc, 2015) created another important window of opportunity in the political
stream.
Thus, commercial pragmatism based on evidence of public consumer preference (or
public mood in Multiple Streams parlance) was a key factor alongside the legislative
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compliance requirements of the EU Radio Equipment Directive, in coupling the co-exist-
ence political stream to the problem and policy streams. As Qualcomm, a key advocate of
LAA, asserted ‘Wi-Fi connectivity is in hundreds of millions of Qualcomm chips sold each
year and embedded into the smartphones and tablets that [licensed] service providers and
manufacturers sell to consumers’, therefore LTE stakeholders ‘have every incentive to
achieve fair coexistence’ (Qualcomm, 2015).
A contested policy environment in which the material interests of the protagonists are
understood to be linked and common and in need of time pressured attention is more likely
to lead to compromise shared policy agendas. The overall features of the three streams in
respect of the co-existence debate analysed in this article are summarised in Table 2.
Conclusion
The technical standards for co-existence process amounts to a European legislation man-
dated, consumer public driven, compromise based on acceptance of two incrementally devel-
oped standards families, likely to sit uneasily aside each other in the unlicensed environment.
In other words, the co-existence agenda set by this compromise is unlikely to assuage
immediately concerns about fair access to communication space. It appears that IEEE
802.11 has achieved its goals of ensuring that LBT remains a predominant communication
protocol in unlicensed spectrum and of convincing ETSI BRANmembers to allow the use of
traditional ED and PD mechanisms through the newly designed IEEE 802.11ax standard.
Yet, at the same time, Wi-Fi interests had to accept the single energy detection threshold
(of −72 dBm) for LAA devices as adopted by 3GPP as a feature of the landscape of co-exist-
ence in an increasingly utilised unlicensed spectrum space. The opportunity ETSI has opened
as a seemingly more neutral venue for coexistence decision-making, provided a policy win-
dow to set in train the ﬁrst steps of consensus-building and, most importantly, a common
agenda on the need for generation and consideration of in-practice coexistence test data.
The co-existence case shows that private technical standards making, like complex pol-
icy processes, can create compromise technical outcomes. Fractious policy development
processes can lead in the end to a clearer understanding of common interests, the ultimate
one in this case amounting to commercial risk in a highly lucrative sector. The technically
Table 2. Applying multiple streams to the case of co-existence in unlicensed spectrum.
Technical standards
LTE IEEE 802
Problem stream Contention free Contention based
Space control Space sharing
Quality of service Provision of access
No LBT LBT
Single EDT Dual EDT
Policy Stream LTE-LAA 802.11ax
LBT LBT
Single EDT Dual EDT
Political Stream
EU Radio Equipment Directive (Parliamentary/legislative)
ETSI standard EN 301 893 revision (technical/legislative)
Seamless licensed-unlicensed use through oﬄoading (consumer/
public preferences)
Regular reception equipment upgrades (consumer/public preferences)
Source: Authors.
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arcane co-existence debate has provided a vital way of setting the ground for an under-
standing of the direction in which the wireless communications environment is proceed-
ing in user terms. Put simply, consumers are unlikely to know or care about the technical
standard that underpins their core preference for aﬀordance of ready and eﬃcient access
to data rich, interactive mobile communications through regularly upgraded reception
equipment.
The historic mandating of LBT in Europe, through the EU and ETSI, inserted it as the
established and predominant cultural and operational norm of unlicensed communication
in Europe and beyond. This created a window of opportunity for negotiation on the see-
mingly insolvable issue of energy detection. Policy ﬂexibility and compromise were necess-
ary to achieve regulatory compliance, where the Wi-Fi community accepted inclusion of
the LTE community’s less sensitive EDL; the LTE community accepted the 802.11ax stan-
dard, though not complete, as a market reality. Applying the Multiple Streams approach to
the co-existence case allows us to see clearly how private technical standards-setting on its
own when viewed through a policy process lens, struggles to solve, unaided, complex
socio-technical problems like co-existence with issues of control and quality of user
experience versus openness and equality of opportunity in communication at their core.
Notes
1. The regulation of the bands falls within FCC’s Part-15 Rules, stipulated in Title 47 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
2. Created in 1999, the Wi-Fi Alliance has provided interoperability certiﬁcation and approved
backward compatibility of Wi-Fi CERTIFIEDTM products (Wi-Fi Alliance, 2016). As seen
further in this paper, the Wi-Fi Alliance has been particularly active in the planning of tech-
nical tests for measuring fair coexistence between LTE and Wi-Fi devices.
3. Founded in 2003, the Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA) focuses on next generation Wi-Fi,
connected cities, wireless innovation and testing, as well as on trials of LTE devices in unli-
censed spectrum (WBA, 2016).
4. Speciﬁcally, the 802.11ax project aimed to increase traﬃc throughput per user by a factor of
four in dense user contexts through ‘implementing mechanisms to serve more users a con-
sistent and reliable stream of data (average throughput) in the presence of many other users’
(National Instruments, 2017, p. 1).
5. Interestingly, Ericsson (as a company) has since proposed the ED/PD option to be deﬁned as
an ‘exception’, but the proposal seems to have been refused by ETSI BRAN (IEEE 802.11
Coexistence SC, 2017).
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